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As the narrative of globalisation in crisis heats up, China has stepped up as a new champion of globalisation with its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. This article repositions ‘China in the
Global South’ to the front and centre of the globalisation discourse. Through a triangular
framework, I differentiate and reconnect the three ‘master’ processes of urbanisation, development and globalisation to understand the inside-outside connections between China’s
domestic transformation and strong impact in the Global South. Using China vs Southeast
Asia and Central Asia, I document how China’s westward development has created new
development opportunities for its overland neighbours and beyond.
Keywords: globalisation, urbanisation, development, China, global south
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Introduction
Globalisation is an inherently uneven spatial
process that tracks the unequal cross-national
distribution of economic and political power.
This power is leveraged by certain dominant nations’ comparative and competitive
strengths during given eras of world history.
Increasingly, dominant global influence from
certain nation states has shifted towards their
powerful global cities or other cities with strategic and special functions. The overlap and
mismatch between national and urban power
creates more complex spatial inequalities
at the regional and local levels. It can however also generate cooperative tendencies to
counter and ameliorate unequal development
and spatial disparity.

These shifts and their consequences raise
new questions about how to understand the
two basic dimensions of national vs city based
influence on nearby and faraway places and
people: scale and connectivity. While ‘scale’ represents important attributes of discrete origins
or locales of power, ‘connectivity’ embodies
the relational aspect of influence. The greater
scale and scope of power originates from more
strategic locations, more key points of contact
and their stronger spillovers. Stronger connectivity of power stems from the larger number,
greater variety and greater intensity of connections that are both virtual through financial networks, and physical via transport links. Relative
to the heavy focus on the power and connectivity of global financial networks, the latter
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deserves our renewed attention in the light of
China’s infrastructure-led approach to globalisation, treated in this article.
While the scale and connectivity of power
underpin the more conventional reach and
impact of globalisation, their continued importance has recently been entangled with the
shifting political ideologies of existing powerful
states that have also been the biggest drivers
of globalisation. With the rhetoric of ‘America
First’ and withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, the USA under President Trump
has taken a big step back from globalisation.
Although Brexit may not be exactly anti-global,
this move also reflects a backlash against the
practices of globalisation such as open borders
and immigration.
These retreats from globalisation look like
temporary setbacks from the long history of
globalisation. Taking a very long view, Chanda
(2007) saw the Silk Road as an early manifestation of globalisation in terms of longdistance trade. If we emphasise the broad
scope and accelerated speed of more varied
and dense global flows, it would make sense
to date the beginning of globalisation to the
1970s. Supporting this timing of globalisation
was China opening its doors and joining the
global economy around 1980. This helped to
usher in a growing body of scholarship advocating globalisation as reflecting an open and
‘borderless’ world economy (see Chen, 2005).
Globalisation has since moved up a big notch,
measured in trade as a share of the world’s
GDP, which rose from 39% in 1980 to 60%
in 2008.1 Despite the global financial crisis in
2008, globalisation measured in the composite Global Connectedness Index rebounded
through 2015 (Ghemawat, 2017).
As globalisation becomes more intensified,
it has brought to light negative consequences,
such as the erosion of national sovereignty
and growing income inequality. Looking back
through the lens of the Great Depression, James
(2008) found an important part of its cause in
the resentments against global capital flows,
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trade and migration, and drew this as a lesson for contemporary globalisation. Critiquing
globalisation as a paradox from a Western
perspective, Rodrik (2011) contends that economic globalisation cannot co-exist with both
democratic politics and national sovereignty,
one of which must be sacrificed for pursuing
globalisation.
Having benefited considerably from globalisation, China has become a counter to this
paradox. It has pursued globalisation with a
strong single Party-state, which does not have
to worry about the erosion of democracy or
loss of sovereignty. China has also gained considerable confidence and stature from becoming more globally connected and integrated.
Against the West’s recent retreats from globalisation, China has stepped up to the front and
centre of the pro-globalisation plate. President
Xi Jinping spoke confidently about the virtue
of open trade and the danger in retreating from
it at the 2017 World Economic Forum. Backing
up this rhetoric with strong action has been the
accelerated implementation of the ambitious
‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) that China
launched in 2013. According to McKinsey’s
new Financial Connectedness Ranking, a key
dimension of China’s global connectedness has
grown, with its outward stock of bank lending
and foreign direct investment tripling from
2007 to 2016 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2017).
China becoming the new champion of globalisation intrigues me and poses two critical
research questions. One is how does China
lead globalisation in ways that differ from the
Western economic powers? It calls for probing, if China can produce a different mode of
globalisation, given its demographic size, newly
acquired economic wealth and political institution. The other question is how to gauge the
growing impact of China-led globalisation? It
begs an investigation into whether China can
deliver more benefits from its approach to globalisation, by creating greater wealth while mitigating inequality. Both questions require a new
starting point and deeper analysis beyond the

2.50

2.55

2.60

2.65

2.70

2.75

2.80

2.85

2.90
2.92

Globalisation redux

3.5

3.10

3.15

3.20

3.25

3.30

3.35

3.40

3.45
3.46

existing literature on globalisation, principally
because China is a distinctive global power
driven by a strong state. With a dual identity as
both a leading global power and a large developing nation, at least for much of its interior,
China’s approach to globalisation calls for
fresh analysis. This article meets this scholarly
challenge by examining China’s leading role in
shaping a new era of globalisation via its widespread and yet geographically concentrated influence in the Global South.
The article is organised as follows. The next
section develops an integrated framework for
understanding the sources, mechanisms and
effects of Chinese globalisation, emphasising
its inside-out dialectic logic. I intend the framework to clarify the distinctive, if not exceptional,
combination of China’s internal and external
regional conditions that has catalysed its global
initiatives across various Asian borderlands. The
framework is then used to guide a pair of case
studies focused on Southeast Asia and Central
Asia, comparing how China’s global strategies
are reshaping urban and regional landscapes
around its borderlands and far beyond. The last
section explores the broader implications from
the interface between the framework and two
case analyses.

Decoding China’s impact in the
Global South
To the extent that we see the current phase of
globalisation in some kind of crisis and China
as a counter force to it, it invokes the translation of the English word ‘crisis’ into the
Chinese language (危机), whose two characters
literally mean ‘crisis-opportunity’. There may
be a Chinese philosophical dialectic ring to the
translation in conveying a sense of contradiction or balance. If globalisation is in crisis, real
or perceived, it may be accompanied by a set
of new opportunities for creating an alternative approach to globalisation associated with
China’s development policies and practices
over the last three decades.

The scale dimension of China’s global economic power is obvious. With a continental
sized territory and world’s largest population,
China sustained the largest share of the world’s
GDP and peaked at around 35% by 1820, far
ahead of the relative positions of the Western
industrialising economies at that time. Having
dropped to about 3% by 1980, China’s weight
of the world’s GDP returned to around 15%
today, two centuries after its historical zenith.2
The combined force of reform, opening and
transformation over only three decades has
elevated China to (a) the world’s second largest economy; (b) the world’s largest trading
nation; (c) the world’s largest exporter; (d) the
world’s largest manufacturer; (e) the world’s
largest energy consumer; (f) the world’s largest auto market; (g) the world’s largest user of
steel, cement and copper; and (h) the world’s
largest applicant for patents. All these superlatives magnify the scale dimension of China’s
global economic power, but they tell us little
about how these top rankings of China’s
strength translate into real impact, and how and
where this impact is truly felt. Scale of power
coupled with its connectivity is key to understanding China’s multifaceted influence across
the Global South.
The large scale of economic power generally translates into an extensive connectivity
of that power, even though this association is
not always linear, and is instead contingent on
how a given nation or city projects its internal
strength in forming external connections carrying and extending a powerful influence. It
also depends on how we think about measuring the correlation between scale and connectivity of a new and different global power like
China. As China grew into the world’s top trading nation, trade as a share of its GDP, a more
conventional measure of trade dependency or
connectivity, rose from 9% in the 1960s to 37%
in 2016.3 While this was a big increase, from a
time when China was basically closed to world
trade, China’s current share of its GDP is expectedly small relative to its overall economic
Page 3 of 24
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scale. It is smaller than the world’s average
of 58%, and even slightly lower than India’s
40%, while the export manufacturing powerhouse of Germany registered at 84% for 2016.4
Looking at global economic power from a different comparative vantage point, the number
of countries for which China is the largest trading partner stands at 124, relative to 56 for the
USA (Khanna, 2016, Map 2). His map shows
that the USA’s top trading ties are heavily concentrated in North America, Western Europe
and the Caribbean, whereas most of China’s
trade ties reach Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia
and Australia. Map 3 in his book also shows the
increasing centrality of East Asia with China at
the core of supply chains and trade networks.
The combination of one long coast and
one lengthy land border facilitates China’s
trade with a larger number of countries, especially those around its (south)western borders,
extending all the way to Europe and the Middle
East. Factoring this geographical thinking triggers other ways of measuring the connectivity
dimension of power beyond conventional
border and long-distance trade. More extensive
overland contiguity or adjacency is conducive
to the construction of transport infrastructure
for linking more geographical points of trade
and economic development. China is geographically endowed and positioned to do so.
Favourable geographical conditions, however,
are insufficient for enhancing the scale of power
through extending its connectivity unless they
are activated by domestic economic forces. To
fully understand this set of factors inside and
outside the Chinese context, we propose a tripartite framework below.

Triangulating China’s inside and
outside
In the academic and policy scholarship on
China’s global rise and impact, there is a tendency to emphasise the scale and scope of
China’s quest for commodities and energy,
massive trade, growing outward investment
Page 4 of 24

and extensive infrastructure provision in the
Global South (see Cardenal and Araújo, 2013;
Economy and Levi, 2014; French, 2014). This
prevalent narrative often leads to an inflated
view that China’s rise will inevitably weaken
the Western (US) dominance (Jacques, 2012) in
a multipolar world, although others have tempered this view by pointing to the possibility
of constraining China’s partial global power
(Christensen, 2015; Shambaugh, 2013).
To regionalise the discussion and analysis of
China’s global impact, we need to recontextualise it in the continued discourse and debate
about the “Asian Century” that has been alive
since the 1980s, when Japan instead of China
was the rising Asian power. Its nuances aside,
the ‘Asian Century’ debate features a persistent split between two camps representing the
euphoric and alarming sides, with China’s
rise and its regional impact looming large on
both sides. From the cheering side, Mahbubani
(2008) attributed the rise of Asia, principally
China, to their adoption of seven pillars of
Western wisdom such as free-market economics, pragmatism and a culture of peace. While
it is debatable if these are inherently Western
wisdom, it reflects a Western-centric way of
seeing Asia’s rise, with China at its centre,
as following or imitating the West (also see
Ferguson, 2012). The most recent voice cautioning against the ‘Asian Century’ is Michael
Auslin (2017), who provides a comprehensive
account of the economic, military, political and
demographic risks that may threaten Asia as a
fractured region of stagnation and instability.
This debate, often tinged by an outside Western
imprint and outrun by dynamic trends, sheds
little light on how China exerts new spatially
focused impacts across Asia from its distinctive
domestic urban development trajectory and
outward-oriented BRI.
Moving beyond the more conventional
debate, Anaya Roy (2016) has turned our analytical gaze towards the set of flows and transactions crossing more intra-Asian boundaries that
make the region less geographically bounded
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in nation states and more in terms of inter-referenced urban and regional spaces. In shifting
the central research question ‘Where is Asia?’
to ‘When is Asia?’, Roy has opened up a new
spatio-temporal vista for analysing how China,
as the economic core and geographical centre
of a rising Asia, can affect the region’s present
and future through its spatially ambitious BRI
with its long horizon. Taking advantage of this
new conceptual place of departure, I follow a
small number of recent attempts to trace the
stages of China’s westward development from
its domestic space to its western overland
neighbours (Summers, 2016; Yeh and Wharton,
2016). Moreover, I go a step further to offer a
broader and more systematic framework for
capturing and explaining China’s widespread
impact in the Global South, which can in turn
guide a focused comparison of this impact
in Southeast Asia vs Central Asia. Figure 1
presents this framework.
In Figure 1, I conceptualise China’s impact in
the Global South as stemming from and feeding back to three ‘master processes’ of urbanisation, development and globalisation. China
figures prominently in the literature on each
of the three broad topics. The combined scale,

speed and pathway of China’s urbanisation,
development and globalisation reflect both
the conventional and distinctive drivers and
outcomes of these processes. While China had
a low level of urbanisation and development
with a high degree of economic closeness until
three and a half decades ago, it has moved rapidly through all three processes, with inside and
outside consequences that translate into an extensive footprint in the Global South. This calls
for taking apart each leg of the triangle and
then putting them back together.

Steering and feeding urbanisation
China’s urbanisation has generated a large
body of research, with a heavy focus on some
of the booming megacities like Shanghai and
Shenzhen, especially on the massive migration
and infrastructure construction (a familiar literature not necessary for review here, see the
special ‘Urban Development in China’ issue
of CJRES, November 2016). What is lacking
is a distillation of the most salient features of
China’s urbanisation, and of how it has interacted with the world beyond its borders, especially its neighbouring countries or regions.
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Figure 1. China’s triangular influence in the Global South.
Source: Conceived and drawn by the author.
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urbanisation has avoided two ‘urbanisation traps’—the ‘overurbanisation’ in Latin
America, where urban growth has exceeded
economic development, especially job creation in cities, and the ‘poverty urbanisation’ in
Africa, where cities have not delivered the benefits of modernisation to rural migrants, who
became poorer as informal settlers after permanently leaving agricultural land. This official
policy spin aside, I summarise China’s distinctive urbanisation as four ‘S’s’.
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Generally speaking, China’s urbanisation
begins and ends with the powerful state driving urbanisation with a very ‘visible hand’. This
perspective sees the state crowding out other
forces in shaping the rapid pace and large scale
of China’s urban transformation. Despite its
wide acceptance, the state-centric model of
China’s urbanisation is not one-dimensional
and spatially uniform. The state has acted vertically with regard to how the central and municipal government interacted both cooperatively
and competitively to drive urban growth. The
state has also mattered horizontally in targeting
different cities and regions with specific policies. The Chinese state takes on a distinctively
steering role in using a variety of policies and
interventions to guide China’s urbanisation
(Chen, 2014).
The state’s steering of urban growth began
with the creation of China’s first and largest
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Shenzhen,
bordering Hong Kong, in 1979. Besides the
soft steering of providing lower taxes as incentives for Hong Kong investors, a stronger version of steering was the state providing upfront
financing for large-scale physical infrastructure
to spur and support industrial growth. As this
rapid growth later ran into bottlenecks such as
the shortage of land and water, as well as environmental degradation, the Shenzhen government tightened restrictions on land approval
and elevated environmental standards by
Page 6 of 24

banning polluting industries, including papermaking and tanning (Chen and de’Medici,
2010).
As Shenzhen took off in the 1980s, the state’s
steering of urban growth moved north along
China’s eastern seaboard, with the designation of 14 other coastal cities as Open Cities
in 1984 and their state-financed Economic and
Technology Development Zones (ETDZs).
The construction of residential towers and
shopping malls also began to scale up and
spread around the booming coastal cities. With
the state steering more resources into inter-city
transport infrastructure, adjacent secondary
cities benefited from the positive spillover
effects from hubs like Shenzhen and Shanghai,
leading to regional economic agglomeration
in the Pearl River and Yangtze River Deltas
(Chen, 2007).
As the coastal cities raced far ahead of the
interior cities, the Chinese state enhanced its
steering role in urban growth by prioritising key
western cities as new hubs of accelerated development, to stimulate the catch-up of the vast
but lagging interior. By designating Chongqing
as a central government municipality in 1997,
the state gave this megacity greater autonomy
and financial support. Chongqing was allowed
to lower enterprise tax from 33 to 24%, or
even to 15%, if these projects were located in
the city’s ETDZ. The state’s steering of urbanisation not only has involved both the central
and local government across regions but also
shifted up and down the administrative structure depending on the strategic importance of
given cities.
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Given the strong steering role of the state, the
fast speed and large scale of China’s urbanisation is fully expected, and also unprecedented
in the Global South. With only 13% of its population being urban around 1950, China was behind India’s 17% and comparable to the level
of urbanisation in some parts of Africa today.
With still less than 20% urban around 1980,
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China has urbanised much faster than India
ever since, reaching about 55% urban today
relative to India’s 35% (Chen, 2014). China
also stands out among the Global South in adding a large number of new cities and scalingup already large cities. With approximately 200
cities around 1980, China has over 600 cities
today. Cities with one million-plus population
in China rose from 20 in 1980 to 102 in 2012,
whereas the number of million-plus cities in
fast-urbanising Africa as a whole grew from
17 to about 50 today. Europe as a whole has 35
such cities.6
In speeding up urbanisation and building
large cities, China has created a huge demand
for imported commodities and energy, mostly
from the Global South. From a country with
no private cars to the largest auto market in
the world, China has dramatically accelerated its petrol consumption. With millions of
high-rise and lower buildings shooting up in its
hundreds of large cities that have to be cooled
and heated, China has led energy consumption
by the world’s cities. In addition, the millions
of kilometres of fibre-optic cables in China’s
skyscrapers and factories require a lot of copper from large mines in Chile and Zambia.
The evidence is clear that the scale and speed
of China’s urbanisation drive its huge demand
for imported commodities and energy (see
Figure 1 and Campanella, 2008).
As China feeds its urbanisation with
imported commodities and energy, it has turned
around in extending its mode of infrastructureled urbanisation to the Global South, especially
Africa. The market share of Chinese companies in Africa’s construction sector rose sharply
from 9.9% in 2002 to 40.1% in 2011, while the
share of US contractors dropped from 24.1 to
6.7% (Huang and Chen, 2016). A new residential town near Luanda, Angola built by China
and empty for some time reminds one of the
many newly built ghost cities and towns in
China (Shepard, 2015). Through multiple crossnational channels, China’s urbanisation not
only has fed on commodities and energy from

the Global South but also left its strong imprint
on the latter’s cities.
7.50

Connected and transferable
development
If urbanisation constitutes a place-based source
and driver of China’s domestic transformation
and international influence, the development
leg of the triangle stretches China’s inside-outside connection. On the surface, China seems to
have followed the footsteps of export-oriented
industrialisation previously pursued by the
former East Asian tigers such as South Korea
and Taiwan. This strategy made sense for China,
given its then-comparative advantages in lower
labour and land costs. If we look more closely
at China’s political institution, territorial and
demographic scale and regional diversity,
China has travelled a more distinctive path of
development, closely tied to its urbanisation,
that has ultimately translated into a centrifugal
impact in the Global South.
Relative to the East Asian developmental
state, the Chinese state has been more purposeful and interventionist since the outset.
While China’s first SEZs around 1980 were
similar to the Export Processing Zones set up in
South Korea and Taiwan during 1965–1970, the
Chinese government designed and shaped them
with two more ambitious goals and supportive
strategies. First, the SEZs were intended to experiment with capitalism and market under a
centrally planned socialist economy. The zones
were located on China’s southeast coast, far
away from the political and economic centres,
to minimise the spatial spill of potential failure.
But they were geographically contiguous and
adjacent with Hong Kong and Taiwan, which
were willing to move surplus capital and declining factories over the land and sea borders into
these zones. The generous tax incentives and
bold policy reforms in the SEZs, like labour
contracts, singled the state’s commitment to
make them successful as a longer-term model
for subsequent development. Second, the
Page 7 of 24
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Chinese state went much farther than its South
Korean and Taiwanese counterparts in building the physical infrastructure needed for much
larger-scale manufacturing.
The ‘first mover’ advantages of a few SEZs
extended into the follow-up development and
prosperity of large coastal cities from the early
1980s into the 1990s. The economic gap between
the booming coastal and lagging inland cities
grew large. While this was the intended goal
of securing quicker and more efficient results
from the much better endowed coastal region,
it turned out to be an unintended consequence
of uneven regional development. In response,
the Chinese state stepped up its interventionist
role around 2000 when it introduced the socalled ‘Go West’ initiative. This consisted of a
set of top-down policies to direct more investment to the interior and to encourage coastal
cities to relocate uncompetitive industries to
the inland cities.
If the state in late East Asian developing
economies needed to be more engaged and
interventionist vs the market (Amsden, 1989;
Wade, 1994), the Chinese state has done much
more in dealing with serious and complex
uneven regional development arising from
spatially targeted development in China’s
diverse economy. The Chinese approach can
be characterised as connected and transferable,
facilitating a staged and coordinated westward
movement of financial resources and development activities (see Figure 2). Besides steering
coastal cities and firms to shift investment west,
the state has built up and out an extensive highway system and high-speed train network, both
the world’s longest, that links the coastal region
to the majority of cities in the interior region
(zones 1 and 2 in Figure 2). By 2015, China’s
high-speed network consisted of four vertical
(north–south) and four horizontal (east–west)
trunk routes totalling 19,000 km, 9661 of which
had an average speed of 300 km/hour. By 2025,
the system is projected to expand to eight vertical and eight horizontal trunk routes with more
spur lines that will connect all cities of 500,000
Page 8 of 24

or more residents, and create a 1- to 4-hour
travel radius between all these cities (Xu, 2017).
With faster and wider transport connections,
investment has also moved west also as a result of spatially differentiated factors of production between zones 1 and 2. The average
manufacturing wages in China’s central and
western provinces were only 21 and 25% of the
coastal average in 2000 and only went up to 39
and 42% in 2013. This wage differential was a
key factor in inducing some coastal manufacturers to relocate to China’s inland provinces to
take advantage of lower costs and policy concessions. By 2015, the value of domestic investment in five central provinces (in zone 2) was
2.5 times that of foreign investment in China
(Ann, 2017). The strong and multifaceted role
of the Chinese state in ameliorating uneven regional development further accentuates the necessity of state intervention in late or lagging
development, beyond the East Asian developmental state over three decades ago (Clifton
et al., 2017). It also serves as a major mechanism
for connecting and coordinating infrastructure,
jobs, firms and wealth across cities and regions,
regarding what Dunford and Liu (2017) call
‘uneven and combined development’ (U&CD).
To ensure that uneven development can be
turned into combined and connected development, the Chinese state has used its still-strong
top-down administrative level in creating special partnerships between wealthy coastal cities and poor border cities in the far west. For
example, Shenzhen and Shanghai have been
directed to provide economic assistance to
Kashgar, China’s most western city, located
near Xinjiang’s border with Pakistan. The
Shenzhen government has granted 10 billion
RMB ($1.5 billion) to build a new campus for
the University of Kashgar. Companies from
Shanghai have set up factories in Kashgar’s
Economic and Technological Development
Zone designated in 2010. In a recent and
important move of transferable development, the Chinese state elevated an expansive
region encompassing the city of Kashgar to a
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Figure 2. China’s connected and transferable westward development (domestic inter-regional to cross-border regional
movement).
Note: (i) Zones 1 and 2 split China’s long coastal and expansive inland regions, while Zones 3 and 4 make up vast transborder
spaces in geographical scope and distance. (ii) Zone 3 comprises the subregions of Asia that border China’s west and southwest by land. It adds up to a massive crescent encompassing a number of China’s western and southwestern borderlands off
Yunnan and Xinjiang. (iii) Zone 4 forms the western end of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including the terminuses
and transit points of a growing number of China-Europe freight trains through Central Asia, and bound for the latter and
its neighbours to the west and south. (iv) The four zones are intended to denote the connected and sequential extension
of China’s economic and infrastructure connections from its east coast to its vast interior and far west under the ‘Go West’
policies since 2000, and then further west into Central Asia, onto Europe and back with BRI since 2013.
Source: Conceived and drawn by the author.
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national level SEZ, with the package of special
incentives originally granted to Shenzhen and
other three SEZs. This designation has raised
Kashgar, an ancient city on the Silk Road, to
a key city for BRI, granting it the same level
of national development priority as the Pearl
River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta and
the northern mega-region including Beijing,
Tianjin and Hebei province. While the spatial
extension and transfer of the SEZ model has

continued since the 1980s, the special transfer
of both financial resources and special policy
from China’s southeast coast to the far western
frontier reflects the significance of ‘Going West’
and ‘Going Out’ through BRI, as linked manifestations of China’s development practice and
discourse (Yeh and Wharton, 2016). It accentuates China’s new effort to globalise beyond its
western borders (from zone 2 into zones 3 and
4, see Figure 2).
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The spatial intersection between China’s urbanisation and development moving west represents its new primary approach to globalisation,
triggered and fuelled by the official launch of
BRI in 2013. While China’s global economic
ties have remained strongest and most extensive through its east coast hubs like Hong Kong
and Shanghai, its small western border cities
have begun to channel a new wave of Chinaled globalisation from powerful domestic
sources and places to China’s western frontier
and far beyond. Building on its legacy of ‘neighbourhood’ or ‘periphery’ diplomacy (Summers,
2016), China now advances the globally ambitious BRI from and through its “Opening up
West” initiative and momentum. This overland
inside-out policy has begun to catalyse catch-up
development of both sides of China’s western
borderlands, thus magnifying its overall impact
in the Global South, including a larger swathe
of Eurasia not traditionally categorised with
this label.
In assessing China’s new and spatially varied impact in the Global South today, we need
to acknowledge a long backdrop seeded over
six decades ago. At the Bandung Conference
in Indonesia in 1955—the first large Asian–
African Conference—China, represented by
Premier Zhou Enlai, played a prominent role
as the discussion by the newly independent
nations focused on tensions with the USA, the
West in general and other Asian states. That
conference was key in defining and pushing
forward the Non-Aligned Movement, built on
the collectively agreed principles of national
independence, territorial integrity, and the
struggle against colonialism and imperialism.
China was actively involved in this movement
and later with The Group of 77 promoting the
economic interests of developing nations. In
fact, China implemented its ideological affinity with ‘The Third World’ through major aid
projects for Asian and African countries. While
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very poor, the Chinese government offered
cumulative aid to Vietnam worth almost $20
billion in today’s value through 1976 and built
the Tanzania–Zambia Railway at a cost equivalent of $3.8 billion today during 1970–1975
(Chen and Myers, 2013). This historical precedent lurks behind a more developed China to
engage with the Global South today.
Having benefited most as the largest developing economy from globalisation, China has
become the kind of new economic power better
prepared to lead more inclusive globalisation.
Spanning over 60 countries and 65% of the
world’s population, including old members and
what may be labelled a new region of the Global
South like Central Asia, as well as Europe, BRI
has a spatially inclusive and diverse coverage.
With a projected total outlay of over $1 trillion, BRI will dwarf the Marshall Plan financially, with no request for military alliances. Key
Chinese government departments driving BRI
have dubbed it as leading the new globalisation
2.0.7 According to Liu and Dunford (2016), the
most salient feature of the BRI approach to
globalisation is its inclusivity, that differs significantly from the neoliberal version of globalisation. It reflects China’s emphasis is on strategic
international economic partnerships and multilateral credit to address investment, infrastructure, employment and economic development’
(p. 325), all of which are critical to the Global
South.
Partly motivating this official posture is a
set of domestic economic concerns, including
slower growth, continued production overcapacity, consumption trailing investment and an
increasingly saturated construction market. By
2006, China was in over-production in 10 industries, especially steel, aluminium, cement, oil
refining and wind power (Pieterse, 2015). Since
2007, China has lost millions of factory jobs due
to the global financial crisis and accelerated
automation, creating more surplus labour that
can no longer be absorbed back in the countryside. During 2014–2016, China had to reduce
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steel production amounting to 120% of the
global total, leading to a loss of 201,000 steelworkers in 2016 alone.8 These pressures, some
of which are structural in economic imbalance and others are contingent, like the financial crisis (Pieterse, 2015), have reinforced the
powerful push of ‘Go West’ to open up new
investment outlets, trade channels and construction projects. Of all the domestic drivers,
China’s construction experience and expertise
accumulated from building numerous roads
and bridges and some extraordinary mega-projects like the Qinghai–Tibet high-speed train
have turned infrastructure into a main focus
and strength of China-led globalisation into
neighbouring Asia.

A pair of case studies
11.20

11.25

11.30

11.35

11.40

How do we find empirical evidence to interrogate the thesis that China now drives an alternative globalisation that originates from
deep domestic sources, and traverses and
influences its western borderlands? Following
the relational logic crossing from Figures 1
and 2, I have identified the Southeast Asian
and Central Asian subregions (highlighted in
Figure 2) as empirical cases for a parallel analysis as opposed to a head-to-head comparison.
As the guiding rationale for this approach, this
pair of cases, in both similar and different ways,
can help us to understand how China has realigned the inside and outside of the relationship among its urbanisation, development and
globalisation (Figure 1). More specifically, the
two cases will illustrate how China, through
spatially connected domestic and cross-border
zones, is capable of catalysing catch-up regional
development in its remote regions, near abroad
and farther beyond (Figure 2).

The China–Southeast Asia border
region and beyond
11.45
11.46

In the first case study, I trace the policy and
factor mobility from China’s coastal region

to its border region with mainland Southeast
Asia (bold box in row 3, Figure 2). This analysis
starts with an acknowledgement that border
cities and regions, which were once remote and
underdeveloped spaces, have picked up both
the speed and scope of urban development.
Small and isolated cities and towns have sprung
from once politically trivial and economically
marginal landscapes (Chen, 2005). This process
has benefited from targeted state policies, more
open borders and improved connectivity of
transport networks, especially in China.
Yunnan province in southwestern China, especially its capital city of Kunming and cities on
the border with Myanmar and Laos, have benefited considerably from the fortune moving
their way. While Yunnan had important historical trade outposts as a key segment of the Silk
Road’s southwestern route, the current composition as a province stagnated from the Cultural
Revolution (1966–1976) through the 1980s, and
fell much behind the coastal region. The 1990s
saw a partial return of Yunnan’s border trade.
The onset of the 2000s brought about China’s
‘Go West’ campaign, which unleashed new
opportunities for Yunnan to leverage its favourable border location for catch-up development.
On 6 May 2011 the central government issued
‘Supporting the Accelerated Construction
of Yunnan as the Important Outpost for the
Southwest Region’, which tasked the capital
city of Kunming to become the international
hub and ‘bridgehead’ for China’s economic cooperation with Southeast Asia. In May 2012,
the Yunnan government approved the establishment of six border economic cooperation
zones. This provincial initiative augmented
the central government’s approval of opening
border economic cooperation zones in the cities of Ruili and Wanding bordering Myanmar.
Playing off as the regional base for the historical ‘southwest Silk Road’, Yunnan has rebuilt
the old connections to Southeast Asia through
its newly revived border cities.
Ruili has been the key city for stimulating
lagged economic development within and across
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the border region. Its Jiegao Border Economic
Development Zone, set up in 1991, promoted
border trade with the small city of Muse on the
Myanmar side. Ruili has really taken off since
August 2013 when the Master Plan of the Ruili
Experimental Zone was approved by the central government. It included 238 new projects
for boosting Ruili as a gathering place and
gateway for economic flows with neighbouring
Southeast Asian economies. Accelerated development has transforming this once-sleepy
border town with a very small population into
a lively city of over 160,000 people today (Chen
and Stone, 2017).
This growth momentum has been met and
matched, albeit to a lesser degree, by Muse,
which created a 150-hectare border trade zone.
Since April 2006, Myanmar merchants can freely
export goods from across the country to Muse
and secure export licenses on the spot within
1 day, after a formal sales contract is confirmed
with Chinese buyers. Furthermore, Myanmar
upgraded the 460-km-long road that connects
the border town to Mandalay, its second largest
city in the central region. This upgrade not only
reduced the travel time from up to a week to
12–16 hours but also made the longer journey
from Muse to Myanmar’s capital Yangon in the
south more convenient. Now Myanmar traders
operating in the space between Muse and Ruili
can board a long-distance bus to Yangon in 24
hours. Although the road conditions between
Muse and Mandalay (and Yangon) are not as
good as between Ruili and Kunming, the improvement has elevated Muse as a major hub
for cross-border trade.
Ruili looms large in Yunnan’s regional role
in China’s trade with Myanmar. Over 80%
of Myanmar’s exports to China and 40% of
its imports from China come across Yunnan’s
border (Singh, 2016). Ruili accounts for the largest share of this trade, while Muse is Myanmar’s
busiest among its 15 border trading stations facing China, Thailand, Bangladesh and Laos.
As of mid-November 2015, Myanmar’s border
trade at Muse rose to $3.36 billion from $2.95
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billion in 2014.9 Border trade between Ruili
and Muse is most intensive at the vibrant jade
market spanning their boundary. This is where
Myanmar jade trader Soe Paing sells raw jade.
His family has been in the jade trade for generations. While examining various pieces of raw
jade in his shop-office, he said, ‘Chinese people
didn’t just start to like jade. They have always
liked jade and used it for thousands of years’
He went on, ‘Our business depends mainly on
China though since other countries are not as
fond of jade as the Chinese’.10
Beyond the more conventional cross-border trade, the city of Ruili has become the
through point for a gas and oil pipeline that
China has built from the port city of Kyaukpyu
on Myanmar’s west coast to Kunming (see
Figure 3). The gas pipeline became operational
in 2013 and carried 2.86 million tons of gas in
2016, accounting for about 5% of China’s total
imports. The oil pipeline, which was completed
in 2014, opened in 2017 after a long delay and
the Myanmar government had agreed to lower
transit fees. The 771-km pipeline is designed
to carry 22 million tons of crude a year (about
442,000 barrels a day) for the Kunming-based
refinery that can process 13 million tons annually.11 This new pipeline allows China to move
crude oil from the Middle East overland and
faster instead of through the slower and potentially risky narrow Straits of Malacca. More
relevant to our framework (Figures 1 and 2), the
pipeline provides a new and added source and
route of energy supply for accelerated urbanisation and development in southwestern China.
The smaller and less developed cities on the
China-Laos border may catch up to Ruili once
an ambitious cross-border China–Laos Railway
is built (Figure 4), preceded and prepared by
enhanced transport development inside Yunnan.
Under an infrastructure plan priced at over $10
billion, a rail line from Kunming to the Mohan
border crossing is under construction. Moreover,
Yunnan’s train connections to the border have
been strengthened by the new high-speed train
from Shanghai to Kunming. Since becoming
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Figure 3. The cross-border China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline: from Kyaukpyu to Kunming through Ruili.
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operational in December 2016, this line, over
2300 km long, has cut the 40-hour trip to less
than 10 hours now. It forms a new and vital link
from zone 1 to zone 2, further integrating the
dominant coastal megacity of Shanghai and the
rapidly growing regional hub of Kunming that
has become the ‘bridgehead’ for China’s economic engagement with Southeast Asia.
While the China–Laos Railway was conceived in 2010, the official agreement was not
signed until November 2015 and ground for
construction broken in Vientiane in December
2015. After formal construction was delayed

without the completion of an environmental
impact study, the line is now scheduled to be
completed by the end of 2021. The line starts in
Kunming and travels southward to the Chinese
border city of Mohan, until entering Laos
through the city of Boten. It then travels past
Vang Vieng and Luang Prabang before arriving in Vientiane. The Laos government expects
roughly four million Lao passengers a year to
use the 414-km railway at first, 6.1 million passengers in the mid-term and 8.1 million passengers in the long run. According to a Laos deputy
prime minister, a total of nearly 10 million
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passengers from China and five other ASEAN
countries are expected to use the railway annually, rising to 11.9 million passengers per year
in the mid-term and 16.5 million in the long
term.12 China envisions this railway as extending from Vientiane to the Thai cities of Nong
Khai and Bangkok (Figure 4), and then all the
way to Singapore via Malaysia, feeding into the
Trans-Asian Railway linking to Europe.
Given the project cost of $6 billion relative to
Laos’ annual GDP of $12 billion, Laos has managed to secure a low-interest 20-year loan of
$800 million from China’s Export-Import Bank
and will form a joint venture with China to borrow a lot more to cover the rest of the cost.13 An
optimistic Laos official believes that Laos will
be able to pay the loan back within 5 years by
selling to China from five potash mines yet to be
excavated. But, given the loan’s size relative to
Laos’ small GDP, pessimistic government officials worry that the risk of financial crisis and
high debt will plague Laos after the project is
Page 14 of 24

completed.14 The International Monetary Fund
warned in 2017 that Laos’ reserves stood at
2 months of prospective imports of goods and
services. It also expressed concerns that public
debt could rise to around 70% of the economy.13
It is too early to know if this project will pay
off for both sides. For landlocked Laos, the
railway makes sense for connecting to outside
markets, especially if the planned industrial
zone near Vientiane’s terminal can stimulate manufactured exports, and if millions of
high spending Chinese tourists cross the border on the train. However, a feasibility study
by a Chinese company said the railway would
lose money for the first 11 years. In the meantime, some Laos farmers are being denied sufficient government compensation for giving
up their land to the railway. In contrast, China
has brought nearly everything, including construction materials and equipment, to the Laos
project. At the peak of construction, there will
be an estimated 100,000 Chinese workers.13
Thus far, China has already benefited from this
mega-project by putting its surplus construction material and workforce to use. In the long
run, China is expected to gain more from better
overland access to Southeast Asia. This project
represents one episode of an unequal China–
Asia economic partnership (Holslag, 2015).
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From the China–Central Asia border
region to Europe and back
China’s ‘Go West’ initiative favouring the vast
interior region has produced a second case of
connected and transferable development creating border intensive change and broader
international connections and ramifications
(the bold box in row 1, Figure 2). It requires
a tracing analysis of similar energy and infrastructure connections but through more linked
places over larger territories and longer distances. Of China’s western regions targeted
for catch-up development, Xinjiang was less
favourably positioned than Yunnan. In spite
of its vast size, one-sixth of China’s landmass,

14.80

14.85

14.90
14.92

Globalisation redux

15.5

15.10

15.15

15.20

15.25

15.30

15.35

15.40

15.45
15.46

Xinjiang has only 23 million people, less than
the city of Shanghai. While rich in natural
resources like oil and agricultural commodities
like fruit, Xinjiang lacks transport infrastructure and manufacturing capacity. Although
Xinjiang’s large population of minority groups
is similar to Yunnan, its dominant Uyghur
group (46% of Xinjiang’s total population),
with its historical and religious (Islamic) connections abroad, has been seen by the Chinese
government as a potentially unstable element
that should be controlled through assimilation and integration. Since the 1950s, the central government has relocated large numbers
of decommissioned military personnel and
civilians from other provinces, especially from
coastal cities, to Xinjiang to set up and sustain
many quasi-military collective farms to stabilise its horticultural and livestock economy
and border areas, with limited state subsided industrialisation. This politically motivated policy
kept Xinjiang’s development away from more
efficient pathways and in a relatively slow and
stagnated rut through the beginning years of
the 21st century.
Despite being further west than Yunnan
and most westerly in China, Xinjiang has
received a larger infusion of the westward
shift of investment and development over
the last decade, with considerably more momentum. So much of this has been riding on
BRI, which has provided an external boost to
the earlier domestically oriented ‘Go West’
initiative. Similar to Ruili, Xinjiang’s border
region with land ports have benefited the
most, grown the fastest and spilled out the
most influence over the borderline and farther
away. The original border pass—now the city
of Horgos—has risen as the ‘Ruili of Xinjiang’
over a few short years, but with much greater
ambition and significance.
Horgos was the oldest land port on China’s
western frontier along the Silk Road and opened
as a customs checkpoint in 1881. Fast forward
to 1983 when Horgos, bordering Kazakhstan,
became one of China’s earliest and most open

land ports for foreign trade, with the good basic
infrastructure and convenient custom clearance procedure in China’s western regions.
However, Horgos fell much behind the booming cities on China’s southeast coast in the 1980s
and also Yunnan’s border cities from the 1990s
to the early 2000s. Fortune turned to Horgos
in 2006 when China and Kazakhstan agreed to
establish the China-Kazakhstan International
Border Cooperation Center, as China’s very
first border cooperation zone of its kind. Split
into 3.43 sq km for China and 1.85 sq km for
Kazakhstan, this enclosed zone straddling the
China–Kazakhstan borderline offers shared
infrastructure facilities and linked duty-free
shopping. In 2014, Horgos was elevated to the
status of a county-level city covering a total of
1908 sq km that also includes the large farming
areas owned by two quasi-military regiments.
While Horgos’ bounded territory (around 2000
sq km) is almost as large as that of the megacity
of Shenzhen, it has only a permanent population of 86,500 and thus has a lot of open land
for new development.
Its current small population aside, Horgos has
begun to play a disproportionately large role as
the most important transport hub along China’s
western border, due to its highly favourable location and rapidly developing infrastructure
connectivity. Situated towards the central point
of the Eurasian region and as the central station along the Eurasian Land Bridge, Horgos
offers a wide access to Central Asia, West
Asia and Europe to the west and to China’s
huge domestic market to the east. The Central
Asia–China gas pipeline, which originates from
Turkmenistan and traverses Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan, crosses at Horgos into Xinjiang. It
transported 18.4 billion cubic meters of natural
gas during the first 2 years of starting to supply
gas in 2009. It connects to China’s second westeast gas pipelines from Horgos and stretches
8704 km to Hong Kong. In the reverse direction, the train from China’s end of the Eurasian
Land Bridge (the coastal city of Lianyungang)
through Horgos and Central Asia to Rotterdam
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ships 22 million tons of goods annually. From
the Horgos bonded trade zone, trucks from
Kazakhstan clear customs in a few minutes and
deliver Xinjiang’s fresh fruit to Almaty’s street
markets and dining tables in less than 24 hours,
as opposed to the old days when it would take
over a week, defeating the purpose of fresh
fruit trade.
Further north from Horgos is another land
port (Alataw Pass) and the city of Alashankou.
With only a small train station in this remote
mountainous corner of China until 1990,
when the China-Soviet cross-border railway
was completed, Alashankou began to grow
the transit train cargo but remained highly
underdeveloped locally, and insignificant for
China’s global economic weight. The place’s
fortunes turned in 2011 when the first ChinaEurope freight train from Chongqing passed
through its border gate and then Central Asia
on its way to Duisburg, Germany. Like Horgos,
Alashankou was upgraded to a county-level
city in 2012. Since the announcement of BRI
in 2013, Alashankou has become another key
border hub as the transit point for most of the
China-Europe cargo trains. This overland train
route has different comparative advantages
over either air or sea shipping. According to
an international logistics expert,15 rail takes
between 23 and 25 days (more hours added than
shown in Table 1, due to first and last mile trucking), ocean 50–55 days and air freight around
10 days. In terms of price, rail service charges
$4000 for a 40-foot container (FEU, each carrying 9600 kg of content), compared with $3000
by sea and $37,000 by air. Rail is much cheaper
than air, while sea travel is cheaper still but
takes too long. For many time-sensitive supply
chains today like handsets and laptops (made
by HP in Chongqing for Europe), cutting a few
days off shipping reduces stock in transit and
thus saves much money (Figure 5).16
The China-Europe Railway has created a
new channel for more Chinese cities to trade
with Europe. There are now 52 routes established between 32 Chinese cities and 32 cities
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in 12 European countries, including lines going
through northern China, Mongolia and Russia
to Europe (see Table 1). Alashankou saw 3800
trains pass through and accounted for 76% of
the approximately 5000 trains as of September
2017.17 Similar to Ruili and Horgos as energy
supply relay points, Alashankou is where the
Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline passes through.
Costing $700 million to lay and running 988
km from Atasu in Kazakhstan to Alashankou,
the pipeline was completed in 2005 and began
operating in May 2006. While its designed capacity was to ship one million barrels of crude
oil per day or 10 million tons of crude oil per
year into western China, the line has been carrying up to 20 million tons per year (Fazilov
and Chen, 2013).
As this second case illustrates, the mode and
spatial shift of urbanisation and development
in China have produced a longer and more
complex chain of energy and infrastructure
links from zone 1 to zone 4 (Figure 2) and back.
Despite the huge distance between China’s
coast and western land border, the strong state
has steered and transferred the early model of
Shenzhen SEZ all the way to Ruili and Horgos
by building them up as newly favoured areas
for catch-up urbanisation and development.
This transferable development has only been
accelerated by massive investment in highways
and railways to connect coastal, interior and
border cities. Although these key border cities remain relatively small, certainly by China’s
urban scale, they have quickly been turned into
gateways for extending China’s economic connections and influence into Central Asia and
further to Europe. In return, they receive and
relay new flows of energy and traded goods
such as German cars, French wine and Spanish
olive oil from zone 4 via Central Asia (zone
3) to prospering megacities like Chongqing
and Chengdu in southwestern China (zone 2 in
Figure 2).
Yet, like the China–Southeast Asia case,
challenges face China–Central Asia connections. On the Chinese side, the infrastructure
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Antwerp, Belgium
Moscow,
Russia

Harbin, China

Xining, China
Guangzhou, China

Harbin, China

Madrid,
Spain
Moscow,
Russia
Hamburg, Germany

Warsaw,
Poland
Czech and
Polish cities
Duisburg, Germany

Hamburg, Germany

10,700 km

24 October
2012
30 October
2012
18 November 2014

—

—

—

—

11,200 km

29 September 2013

11,500 km

—

9820 km

6578 km

13,052 km

11,808 km

10,245 km

11,000 km
9965 km

18 July 2013

19 March 2011
26 April 2013

Source: Tabulated from information compiled by Prof. Yina Zhang, Fudan University, Shanghai.

11. Guangzhou–Moscow

10. Xining–Antwerp

9. Harbin–Hamburg

8. Harbin–Moscow

7. Yiwu–Madrid

Wuhan, China

5. Wuhan–The Czech Republic
and Poland
6. Changsha–Duisburg
Changsha,
China
Yiwu, China

Suzhou, China

4. Suzhou–Warsaw

3. Zhengzhou–Hamburg

Duisburg, Germany
Lodz, Poland

Chongqing, China
Chengdu,
China
Zhengzhou, China

Distance

IT products (i.e. laptops)
IT products
Consumer products (e.g.
clothing)
IT products (from near
Shanghai)
Consumer electronics (from
central China)
—
Small merchandise
Products from northeastern
China
Products from northeastern
China
Local products from western
China (Tibet)
Consumer electronics (from
southern China)

15 days
14 days
15 days

21 days
—

—

12 days

—

18 days

15 days

15 days

Main cargo

Travel time

17.5

1. Chongqing–Duisburg
2. Chengdu–Lodz

Launch date

17.20

Destination city

17.15

Departing city

17.10

Line

Table 1. Trans-continental rail routes between China and Europe through Central Asia.
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Figure 5. The main China–Europe freight train route through Central Asia.
Source: Chen and Mardeusz (2015, 6–7).

provision in Horgos or Alashankou has far
outpaced the shortage of local human capital,
forcing the Xinjiang government to offer high
salaries and housing subsidies to lure talents
from interior provinces. Externally, the weaker
commitment and fewer resources in Central
Asia for cross-border cooperation have created asymmetrical power relations. Given the
inability of the Kazakh government to fully
build up the commercial and logistic facilities in
its smaller segment of the border cooperation
zone, a Chinese company has stepped over to
build it, thus creating a greater power leverage
for China over Kazakhstan.18
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Conclusion
In conceptualising China’s domestic transformation and global rise through a triangular lens
anchored to urbanisation, development and globalisation, we begin to see how China has made
a big difference to the drivers, mechanisms and
outcomes of these three ‘master’ processes. The
Chinese experience presses us to trace the manifestation of its development and globalisation
deeply into how China’s cities have been (re)
built. It also clarifies how the undesirable consequences of dramatic urbanisation, especially
economic imbalance and regional inequality, are
being mediated by a strong state’s connected and
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transferable development policies. Motivated
by its spatially phased urbanisation and development, China has adopted an alternative and
ambitious approach to globalisation through
BRI that privileges intra- and inter-regional
infrastructure within and across borders for
facilitating peripheral urbanisation, catch-up
development and more inclusive globalisation.
I argue that China’s urbanisation is the deepest source and strongest driver of its westward
development and outward globalisation, as well
as their mutual reinforcement. As the high speed
and large scale of urbanisation triggered by the
SEZs led to the boom of coastal cities and thus
regional inequality, the state has stepped up its
steering role in accelerating and scaling up interior urbanisation and extending the largely
successful model of SEZs to western border
cities. This policy has led to somewhat lagging
but not permanently delayed ‘peripheral urbanisation’ by upgrading long neglected small
border cities. While they are not comparable to
coastal cities like Shenzhen and Shanghai, their
importance can no longer be measured only
in size and functional strength. They have become critical for transmitting China’s domestic
development impulses out to the underdeveloped border cities and regions of neighbouring
countries. In other words, the latent strength of
once vibrant Silk Road cities like Kashgar and
Horgos has been activated and updated to suit
the needs of BRI. The faster growth and larger
role of these cities are directing our analytical
attention from the financial hubs at the top of
the global urban hierarchy to the understudied
small and border cities at its bottom. It also
lends some credence to the notion of ‘planetary
urbanisation’ reaching remote places and blurring traditional boundaries (Brenner, 2014). To
the extent that this qualifies as China urbanising from the Global South to influence other
Global South cities, it can make these ‘ordinary
cities’ (Robinson, 2006) ‘special’ in their new
development trajectory. With the potential to
spur growth of near-abroad cities like Luang
Prabang on the China–Laos Railway and of

Central Asian cities along the China-Europe
Railway, China’s border cities such as Ruili and
Horgos can play a long-term role in producing
more connected spatial economies and reducing within- and between-country inequalities
that make up the postcolonial geography of a
rising Asia (Asian Development Bank, 2011;
Raghuram et al., 2014).
From the development vantage point of the
triangular framework (Figure 1), the two cases
renew our understanding of the local, national
and global dimensions of development relative
to urbanisation and globalisation. We tend to
see China as having pursued export-oriented
industrialisation led by a stronger version of
the East Asian developmental state. As many
Chinese cities, especially those with factory
dominant industrial zones on the coast, prospered from their manufactured exports, their
development has been sustained by rich revenues from land sales for both industrial use
and (increasingly) real estate construction.
Of the total local revenues in 2016, land sales
and transfers fees accounted for almost 60%.
As urbanisation-fuelled development has produced serious regional inequality, the state
has addressed it aggressively through what
I call connected and transferable development policies, leveraging the much more spacious and cheaper land resources in the west.
Building transport infrastructure to connect to
the smaller and the less developed cities in the
west has more room and cushion for China to
rebalance its national economy by reducing the
concentration of wealth and production in its
eastern cities. In addition, small border cities
like Ruili and Horgos would not have developed as fast without receiving the transfer of
the SEZ policy and practice from the coast.
Despite this policy mobility, over-investment
fuelled by BRI without regard for different
local and regional conditions has led to underutilised infrastructure and even entire new
‘ghost cities’ like the New City outside Lanzhou
(Shepard, 2015), the capital city of Gansu province, bordering Xinjiang.
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Globally, China’s rapid urbanisation has
translated into some kind of development opportunity for certain Global South countries
through the latter’s large exports of commodities and energy. This development benefit is,
however, unstable as China’s slower urbanisation and development in recent years has
already dampened the growth of the Global
South’s export of commodities and energy.
Due to the contraction of China’s construction
market, China, which accounts for half of the
global production of steel and cement, tries to
export its surplus steel and cement as part of its
push to build more infrastructure in the Global
South, and thus may suppress the latter’s commodity prices further. In its infrastructure-led
globalisation under BRI, China also brings
larger numbers of its own construction workers
to overseas mega-projects like the China–Laos
Railway, who interact little with from local
communities due to language and cultural barriers. This has contributed to isolated riots in
parts of Central Asia, where Chinese workers
in Kyrgyzstan were attacked for having more
privileged working conditions over domestic
workers. If China continues to create little local
employment for large overseas infrastructure
projects, it will fall short of securing the full potential positive local impact of these projects in
their Global South countries and cities.
Finally, as China’s urbanisation and development have become more externally connected,
they have reshaped the current phase of globalisation through an unconventional combination of strategic means and spatial fixes. It
reflects the coupling of scale and connectivity
of China’s global economic power that originates from deep inside its domestic economic
restructuring and extends far out in an uneven
manner. China is pioneering infrastructureoriented globalisation on a historically unprecedented scale in the Global South. While
China is expected to globalise by relocating its
labour-intensive manufacturing to the cheaper
locations in the Global South, it has gone further in ‘exporting’ its civil engineering and
Page 20 of 24

construction expertise and experience in building roads, bridges and power stations across
much of the Global South. China’s crucial role
in building infrastructure beyond its borders
is timely and significant in light of the global
infrastructure gaps. According to McKinsey
Global Institute (2016), the world needs to invest about 3.8% of GDP, or an average of $3.3
trillion, to support economic growth, with 60%
of this need coming from the Global South;
yet the world invests only $2.5 trillion a year
today, creating a huge gap of $0.8 trillion, or
$350 billion a year. Having invested 8–9% of
its GDP in infrastructure at home and abroad,
China is capable of meeting a disproportionate
part of the global infrastructure gap, which
renders infrastructure a hallmark of its brand
of globalisation and complicates the more conventional view of China as an export-driven
manufacturing power.
While expecting the more expansive and connected cross-border transport infrastructure
to stimulate quick manufacturing as at home,
China’s launch of many cargo trains to Europe
through Central Asia may sustain its declining
manufacturing bases in its coastal and central
regions, while generating more domestic consumption by importing more European goods.
By building and extending infrastructure to and
through its far western region, China expects
the feedback benefits of sustaining its main domestic manufacturing bases and rebalancing
the entire economy to consumption, especially
in the interior. China’s priority for multiplying
cross-border transport connections to the west
has also elicited reciprocal moves from Central
Asia, as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to build a new road from Andijan
through the border city of Irkeshtam to Kashgar
in Xinjiang. (Kashgar is the Chinese end of the
ambitious China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC), a critical cog of the BRI wheel.) This
will create the shortest route for Uzbekistan to
export organic vegetables and fruit to the large
China market. China’s growing cross-border
ties with Central Asia, and through the latter,
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with Europe, is ‘re-centring’ Eurasia as a geopolitically and now geoeconomically significant
region of the world.
As globalisation is heading into perhaps a crisis phase, which is debated in this special issue
of CJRES, I have presented China as a new
power spreading footprints and creating some
urbanisation and development opportunities
in the Global South in a way that may refashion the course of globalisation. China’s strong
influence in the Global South has grown from
the co-evolution of its domestic urbanisation
and development. This inside-out process is
capable of positioning China as a different kind
of globaliser vs the Global South. By combining an analysis of two cases through the framework (Figure 1) and its associated scheme of
connected domestic and cross-border regional
development (Figure 2), I have revealed some
hidden and missed intersections and interdependencies between China’s domestic economic and spatial restructuring and distinctive
approach to globalisation, using infrastructure
as the main driver to ‘Go West’ in order to go
further west via BRI. This process has opened
a new research vision and focus onto small but
rapidly growing Chines border cities and similar near-abroad cities that will become more
important for understanding the shifting spaces
of globalisation, and thus deserve our attention.
China-led globalisation, promising and significant as it may be, suffers from both internal
and external constraints. Huge investment in
building large-scale infrastructure in the Global
South has contributed to China’s debt rising
to 300% of its GDP. From the Global South,
for example, the inability of the Sri Lankan
government to meet the interest payment on
an official $8 billion loan from China for constructing Hambantota Port, a key link of BRI,
has recently allowed the partially state-owned
China Merchants Ports Holdings to get a controlling stake in this port.19 While the debt burden may force China to take fewer risks and
slow down its infrastructure-driven global
strategy, the limited financial ability to service

debts on projects like the China–Laos Railway
can translate into a broader concern among
the Global South about becoming dependent
on China. It is up to China to temper its global
economic power with a more responsible and
equitable approach if it is to live up to its professed goal and leading role in fostering South–
South cooperation.
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